Under Siege: The Jurisdictional and Interagency Problems of Protecting the National Information Infrastructure by Perisco, Brian A.
UNDER SIEGE: THE JURISDICTIONAL AND INTERAGENCY
PROBLEMS OF PROTECTING THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
Brian A. Persico
By the rude bridge that arched the flood,
Their flag to April's breeze unfurled,
Here once the embattled farmers stood,
And fired the shot heard round the world.
1
Since its 1975 invasion of the ex-Portuguese col-
ony of East Timor, 2 the Indonesian government
has been involved in a low-intensity conflict with
the East Timorese Liberation Front, Freitilin. In a
struggle characterized by occasional ambushes of
government patrols and reprisals, the likelihood
of escalation beyond this little-known, little-cared
about backwater seemed a remote possibility.3
Beginning in early 1997, however, Indonesians
operating Internet websites noticed seemingly ar-
bitrary intrusions into file servers followed by the
appearance of statements in support of East
Timorese independence. 4 Primary targets ap-
peared to be the Indonesian Armed Forces
("ABRI"), government ministries, the National In-
stitute of Sciences and state-run universities.
While no permanent damage resulted from these
attacks, the ABRI launched what were described
as "counter operations in the war of propaganda
on the Internet ' ' 5 and attacked the intruders In-
ternet homepages. These "counter operations"
were not directed against Indonesian citizens
under the jurisdiction of the Indonesian govern-
ment but against a group of hackers in Portugal. 6
I RALPH WALDO EMERSON, CONCORD HYMN (sung at the
completion of the Concord, Massachusetts monument, July
4, 1837).
2 See JAMES F. DUNNIGAN & AUSTIN BAY, A QUICK AND
DIRTY GUIDE TO WAR: BRIEFINGS ON PRESENT AND POTENTIAL
WARS 447 (3d ed. 1996).
3 See id. at 448.
4 See Cyberwar Reality, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 30, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 10557101; see also ABRI and Government Told
To Give Internet Hackers The Chop, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 30, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 10557097.
5 See Guerrilla Hackers Take On Military, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, May 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2261853.
6 See id.
Intrusions were subsequently reported at the
ABRI and Department of Foreign Affairs websites,
the government computer system, the Indonesian
Institute of Studies, and the Surabaya Institute of
Technology. 7
Beginning August 1, 1998, and continuing for
the next 48 hours, the implications of acting
against the Portuguese hackers became clear to
the Indonesian authorities. The Portuguese
hacker group "KaotiK Team"8 eventually defaced
forty-five websites belonging to the government,
Indonesian-based international organizations, pri-
vate industry and Indonesian Internet service
providers.9 KaotiK Team, a group dedicated to
fighting for East Timorese liberation, pledged to
continue operations until Indonesia's occupation
of East Timor ends) 0 A new dimension of con-
flict had arrived in Indonesia and literally, the
shot was heard around the world.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of the Internet as a form of
mass media has resulted in a debate among the
federal government's law enforcement, intelli-
gence and defense communities concerning the
extent of vulnerability of the National Informa-
7 See id.
8 See KaotiK Team (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://
www.complex-x.net/kaotik/intro.html> (describing the goals
of KaotiK Team and its attack on fourty-five Indonesian web
sites).
9 See Hackers Compromise 45 Indonesian Web Sites, NETWORK
WEEK, Aug. 4, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16054478; see Kaotik
Protest Conditions In East Timor, ANTIONLINE (Aug. 2, 1998)
<http://www.antionline.com/SpecialReports/KaotiK/>.
10 See Kaotik Protest Conditions In East Timor, ANTIONLINE
(August 2, 1998) <http://www.antionline.com/SpecialRe-
ports/KaotiK/>; see also KaotiK Team (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://www.complex-x.net/kaotik/intro.html> (stating
KaotiK Team's goals and self-proclaimed capabilities).
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tion Infrastructure ("Nil")1" to an incident such
as the August 1998 attack on Indonesian websites.
In response to these concerns, the Acquisition
and Technology Policy Center of the RAND Cor-
poration's National Defense Research Institute, 12
in conjunction with the National Defense Univer-
sity, 13 conducted a study for the Office of the As-
sistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Con-
trol, Communications and Intelligence in early
1995.14 The study and its results, constituted one
of the first gatherings of defense, intelligence, law
enforcement, academia and industry personnel to
identify emerging topics specifically related to the
vulnerability15 of the NII. 16
The object of the study was to assess the deci-
sion making process during a major hypothetical
"information warfare" attack launched against the
United States during a crisis in the Persian Gulf
region.' 7 Based upon the RAND Corporation's
projected trends in the world's geopolitical bal-
l1 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Information Security and Privacy Network Environments (1994),
quoted in Greg Rattray, The Emerging Global Information Infra-
structure and National Security, 21:2 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
81 (1997) (describing information infrastructures as net-
works of computer hardware and software, data storage and
generating equipment, abstract information and its applica-
tions, trained personnel and interconnections between all
these components through the public-switched telephone
network, satellite and wireless networks, private networks and
the Internet).
12 The Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the
RAND Corporation's National Defense Research Institute is a
federally funded research and development center. See
RAND Corporation (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://
www.rand.org>. Its primary role is to improve public policy
through independent research and analysis. See id.
13 The mission of the National Defense University is to
serve as the post-graduate center for military education for
the armed forces and to provide research to support national
security objectives. See National Defense University (visited Nov.
11, 1998) <http://www.ndu.edu>.
14 See Roger C. Molander et al., Strategic Information War-
fare: A New Face of War iii, 8 (National Defense Research Insti-
tute, Rand Corporation, 1996).
15 See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRITI-
CAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: -CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS -
PROTECTING AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURES B-3 (1997) (herein-
after PCCIP REPORT) (defining vulnerability as a characteris-
tic of a critical infrastructure's design, implementation, or
operation of that renders it susceptible to destruction or in-
capacitation by a threat).
16 See Molander, supra note 14, at 8-9 (stating that partici-
pants represented industry, academia, the analytic and re-
search communities, the intelligence community, national se-
curity policy-makers, and the military services at the levels of
Chief Executive Officer, Two- and Four-star military officers
and assistant secretary-level civilian employees in the U.S.
government).
ance of power, the exercise's scenario was based
upon a fictitious split between members of the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
("OPEC") over levels of oil production. 18 Simul-
taneous with the study's fictitious disruption in re-
lations, simulated infrastructure breakdowns oc-
curred in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United
States. 19 Reports that the banking system of the
United Kingdom was compromised by hacking re-
sulted in a sharp drop in worldwide stock markets
as investors feared that fund transfer systems were
compromised were also added to the simulation's
fact pattern.20 This drop, combined with massive
increases in the price of oil, resulted in a looming
worldwide economic collapse. 21  In addition, a
successful disinformation campaign led to media
reports that the United States government was on
the brink of an aggressive and unprovoked war in
the Persian Gulf Region. 22 Evidence was
presented to the participants suggesting that
17 The RAND Corporation described the hypothetical
fact pattern for a Persian Gulf Major Regional Contingency-
Type Crisis as:
Iran seeks hegemony over the Persian Gulf region (circa
2000) by the overthrow of the Saudi Kingdom through a
coup by dissidents in Saudi Arabia. A major military cri-
sis develops in the region with a decision by the United
States to deploy forces as a deterrent maneuver. Iran
and its Saudi domestic 'ally' conduct information war-
fare attacks on the Saudi government and the U.S. gov-
ernment.
See id. at 6.
18 See id. at 64. (stating that during a May 4, 2000, OPEC
meeting in Caracas, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria promote a
major cutback in production with a goal of driving the price
to at least $60 (FY-95 dollars) a barrel); see generally DANIEL
YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND
POWER 519-27 (1991) (describing OPEC membership and
goals).
19 See Molander, supra note 14, at 64-65 (describing a loss
of power in Cairo for several hours; massive failures in the
public switched telephone network in Northern California
and Oregon; a mass-dialing attack on Fort Lewis, Washing-
ton; a malfunction leading to a large explosion and fire at
the largest Arabian-American Oil Company refinery near
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; and a high-speed train collision in
Maryland).
20 See id. at 66, 74, 78 (describing malfunctions at auto-
matic tellers in Georgia and wild fluctuations at the Chicago
Commodity Exchange bring widespread suspicion that "the
Exchange was being subjected to a powerful form of elec-
tronic manipulation by parties unknown").
21 See id. at 78 (stating that at the close of the spot oil
market the price for crude oil topped $100 a barrel).
22 See id. at 79 (describing the initiation of a information
warfare campaign by the 'Action Arm of the Committee for
Planetary Peace' with a call for widespread civil disobedience
to thwart an Administration that had, "lost touch with domes-
tic and international reality").
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these incidents were the result of coordinated at-
tacks on critical Nil components23 in support of a
coup attempt in Saudi Arabia backed by Iran.24
The study's participants found that American
and Allied military responses to the Persian Gulf
situation were sharply degraded in effectiveness
by the loss of critical NII support overseas25 and
massive civil disobedience in the United States.26
The exercise highlighted the serious vulnerability
of the NII to organized attacks, thereby under-
mining the United States' ability to protect vital
national interests and its allies. 27 The participants
determined that any such attack on the NII would
hinder the ability of the United States to act deci-
sively in the event of a similar crisis in the fu-
ture.28 Their findings emphasized the need for
changes in planning against threats to the NII, es-
pecially regarding the development of informa-
tion warfare 29 capabilities by organizations or for-
eign nations in the future. In particular, the
report suggested that current assumptions of se-
cure communications in the United States were
misplaced because of the increasing reliance
upon Internet-based infrastructures for planning,
logistics and research and development.3 0
Since the RAND study's publication, the federal
government has launched several initiatives to ad-
23 See id. at 66 (stating that the Iranian Ambassador to
the UN is overheard to state that the United States was highly
vulnerable to attacks by states and others who had mastered
contemporary computer and telecommunications technol-
ogy).
24 See id. at 74, 76. (describing the mobilization of six
Iranian armored and mechanized divisions and coup at-
tempts in Dhahran and Mecca, Saudi Arabia).
25 See id. at 77 (stating that the Secretary of Defense is
informed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff that a infor-
mation warfare attack was then underway at almost every mil-
itary base in the United States and Europe involved in the
deployment to the Persian Gulf).
26 See id. at 77 (describing hypothetical efforts by the
Coast Guard and local police to break up a flotilla of boats
attempting to "blockade" the sealift ship U.S.S. Bob Hope from
sailing to the Persian Gulf from Savannah, Georgia).
27 See id. at 41-42 (describing the findings of the study's
participants).
28 See id.
29 See Todd A. Morth, Note, Considering Our Position: View-
ing Information Warfare as a Use of Force Prohibited by Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter, 30 CASE. W. REs.J. INT'L L. 567, 571 (1998)
(defining information warfare as "a state activity which has an
incapacitating effect on the ability of the owners of any infor-
mation network to use or manage that network. This in-
cludes, but is not limited to, telecommunications, electrical
power systems, gas and oil storage, transportation, banking
and finance, military forces, and emergency services"); see
also Robert G. Hanseman, The Realities and Legalities of Infor-
dress the report's conclusions. This Comment de-
fines the elements that are critical to the NII and
how they are vulnerable to disruption through
computer-based means. Next, this Comment eval-
uates the federal government's efforts at address-
ing NII vulnerabilities, the findings of the Presi-
dent's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection ("PCCIP") and the measures taken in
response to the PCCIP Report by Presidential De-
cision Directives 62 and 63. Additionally, this
Comment analyzes the current statutes relevant to
NII protection and the jurisdictional mandates of
selected government agencies implicated by such
statutes. Finally, this Comment analyzes possible
alternatives for protecting the NII based upon
past government experience and the PCCIP re-
port.
II. THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS
VULNERABILITIES
A. Critical Infrastructures
Information infrastructures consist of networks
of computers,3 1 data storage and generating
equipment, administrators and the interconnec-
mation Warfare, 42 A.F. L. REv. 173, 176 (1998) (stating the
U.S. Air Force's definition of information warfare in the con-
text of offensive and defensive operations).
30 At the conclusion of the exercise, the RAND study
provided four major recommendations for addressing short-
comings in the protection of the NII. First, participants
agreed that there should be a focal office within the federal
government for detecting and monitoring threats to the NII
at the level of the Office of the President because of the need
for coordination of a large number of organizations at the
federal, state and local levels of government and in private
industry. Second, the federal government should embark on
a risk assessment to identify potential areas of risk to the NII
and develop methods to counter those threats due to the dy-
namic and constantly evolving environment of cyberspace
threats and vulnerabilities. Third, the government's role in
defending and protecting against threats to the NII must be
well defined. The primary role advocated was maintenance
of critical NII systems, promoting policies among private in-
dustry to reduce vulnerability and iniproving recovery capa-
bilities in the event of attack. Fourth, the vulnerability of the
NII needs to be addressed as a national security concern
rather than simply a public policy issue because of the high
probability that the sources of disruption would in many
cases originate from overseas sources. See Molander, supra
note 14, at xvii-xxi.
31 See HENRY H. PERTrr JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAY §1.2 (1996) (defining the types of computers
comprising information infrastructures as "clients" with
which users interact directly and "servers" which store and
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tions32 between these components. 3 3 In support
of these building blocks of information infrastruc-
tures are public switched telephone networks
("PSTN"), satellite communications networks, pri-
vate networks and the Internet.34 Through the
creation of such information infrastructures, large
amounts of data can be transferred to several loca-
tions simultaneously, increasing the ability of all
users to communicate more efficiently. Beginning
in the early 1990's, the rapid commercialization
of the Internet 5 resulted in the expansion of the
use of such infrastructures and eventually, the cre-
ation of the NII.36
Today, many major industries, particularly
those in the telecommunications and energy ar-
eas, have utilized the NII to accelerate the quality,
quantity and efficiency of the services which they
provide.37 Technological advances facilitated by
the NII have yielded improved services at lower
costs, opened up new markets for goods and serv-
ices and accelerated the flow of new ideas. As a
result, however, the dependence on these tech-
nologies has increased and eliminated the redun-
dancy which gave their predecessors resilience
should failure occur.38 A large portion of the NII
depends upon the use of the public switched tele-
phone network and the Internet for the transfer
of information.3 9 This network depends on elec-
tricity, computer operated systems, telephone
process information for large numbers of client computers).
32 See id. (stating that when the Internet is accessed, cli-
ent computers access servers owned by the organizations with
which they wish to communicate through requests routed to
the server by the client).
33 See Rattray, supra note 11, at 82.
34 See id. at 83.
35 The Internet was created as a communications tool for
use by the United States government and private institutions
conducting military research in the late 1960s. By linking
many computers together, a decentralized system of com-
puters was created to withstand a nuclear attack by dispersing
data to multiple locations, some of which would survive the
attack. Also, the Internet allows messages to reach their des-
tinations through many different routes. Thus, if some com-
puters were destroyed, communication remained possible
among the surviving locations. See Sean Selin, Governing Cyber-
space: The Need for an lnternational Solution, 32 GONZ L. REv.
365, 367 (1997); see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997) (describing the develop-
ment of the Internet).
36 See Vice President Albert Gore, Address to the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union Development Confer-
ence, Buenos Aires, Argentina (Mar. 21, 1994) (stating that
the U.S. NII consists of hundreds of different networks, run
by different technologies, all connected together in a giant
network of networks), quoted in Rattray, supra note 11, at 82.
37 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at 10. The PCCIP
lines, and fiber optic cables to facilitate communi-
cations. The increasing demand by public and
private organizations for information also ensures
that the number of access points will rapidly in-
crease with time.40 The fundamental issue facing
the government today is how to effectively main-
tain the Nil while preventing individuals or orga-
nizations which seek to disrupt these activities
from penetrating critical components of infra-
structure.
This increasing dependence on information in-
frastructures is not merely a private sector phe-
nomenon. The NII is integral to the operation of
practically all vital defense and public service
functions performed at every level of government.
Specifically, five areas were identified by the PC-
CIP as "critical" components of the NIl. These ar-
eas are telecommunications, transportation, vital
human services, energy, and banking and fi-
nance. 4 1 Significant disruption in any of these ar-
eas is of primary concern when discussing the
threats to the NII today.
B. Threats to the NII's Critical Components
Traditionally, threats to the stability of govern-
ment infrastructures have arisen in the form of
physical attacks42 against key sites by terrorist
groups or through actions by foreign nations
stated that NII dependence has grown because: "Organiza-
tions have harnessed information technology to accelerate
their delivery of goods and services, tighten the efficiency of
their processes, and shed excess inventory and unused re-
serve capacity. Many businesses are so tightly balanced in
their just-in-time' processes that recovery from even a minor
disruption would prove difficult." See id.
38 Cyber Attack: Is the Nation At Risk?, Hearing Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 1 05th Cong. (June 24,
1998), (Testimony of George J. Talent, Director, Central In-
telligence Agency) (stating "...we have staked our way of life
on the use of information. We rely more and more on com-
puter networks for the flow of essential informa-
tion... reliability breeds dependence - and dependence pro-
duces vulnerabilities .... Disruptions in information-based
technologies can range from being a serious nuisance... to
potentially disastrous.").
39 See Rattray, supra note 11, at 83 (stating that the vast
majority of transactions and information flows "rely on the
vulnerable public switched network for transmission by
landline, microwave or satellite means").
40 See The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda
for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025 (1993) (stating that the gov-
ernment has a duty to ensure that all Americans have access
to the resources and job potential of the Information Age).
41 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at A-1.
42 See id. at B-3 (describing physical security as action
"taken for the purpose of restricting or limiting unauthor-
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which threaten national interests. Today, while
these conventional forms of action continue to oc-
cur,43 new types of "threats" have arisen in con-
junction with increased reliance on the Nil.
These threats include foreign and domestic enti-
ties (e.g., an individual, organization or nation)
possessing both the capability44 to exploit a weak-
ness in a critical infrastructure 45 and the mali-
cious intent4 6 of debilitating defense or economic
security. 47 Such entities initiate attacks48 with the
goal of destroying, 49 incapacitating 50 or debilitat-
ing 51 Nil systems to accomplish the tasks assigned
to them. Due to the diverse nature of the compo-
nents of the NII, the individual characteristics
that make them vulnerable to attack should be ex-
plored.
1. Telecommunications
The expansion of the information and commu-
nications infrastructure in the United States has
led to radical changes in the way government and
economy communicate. This critical infrastruc-
ized access, specifically, reducing the probability that a threat
will succeed in exploiting critical infrastructure vulnerabili-
ties including protection against direct physical attacks, e.g.
through use of conventional or unconventional weapons").
43 See generally The New Terrorism, THE ECONOMIST, Aug.
15-21, 1998, at 17-19 (describing current trends in terrorism
in light of the Aug. 7, 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in
Tanzania and Kenya).
44 See PCCIP Report, supra note 15, at B-i (describing
capability as "the ability of a suitability organized, trained,
and equipped entity to access, penetrate, or alter govern-
ment or privately owned information or communications sys-
tems and/or to disrupt, deny or destroy part of a critical in-
frastructure").
45 See id. at B-i (defining critical infrastructures as "infra-
structures which are so vital that their incapacitation or de-
struction would have a debilitation effect on defense or eco-
nomic security").
46 See id. at B-3 (describing intent as "demonstrating a de-
liberate series of actions with the objective of debilitating de-
fense or economic security by destroying or incapacitating a
critical infrastructure").
47 See id. at B-2 (describing economic security as "the
confidence that the nation's goods and services can success-
fully compete in global markets while maintaining or boost-
ing real incomes of its citizens").
48 See id. at B-i (describing an attack as "a discrete mali-
cious action of debilitating intent inflicted by one entity
upon another. A threat might attack a critical infrastructure
to destroy or incapacitate it").
49 See id. at B-1. (defining destruction as "a condition
when the ability of a critical infrastructure to provide its cus-
tomers an expected level of products and services is negated.
Typically a permanent condition. An infrastructure is consid-
ered destroyed when its level of performance is zero.").
ture includes the PSTN, the Internet and the mil-
lions of computers for personal, commercial and
governmental use. Prior to the widespread intro-
duction of cellular service in the 1980's, 5 2 the
landline telephone system provided virtually all
telecommunications service. 5 3 This system of fi-
ber optic and copper cables comprises the back-
bone of the telecommunications infrastructure. 54
The PSTN is primarily operated by software-
driven switching systems which automatically con-
nect and disconnect users at all points of the sys-
tem. 55 The Internet relies upon the PSTN to fa-
cilitate data transport between remote users by
breaking messages into small packets of data.56
This data is sent from relay point to relay point
over different paths to its destination where it is
reassembled upon arrival. 57 The lack of direct
connection leaves the system vulnerable at inter-
mediate points. 58
Threats to the telecommunications infrastruc-
ture can come from physical or cyberspace 59 at-
tacks at many points in the process.60 Physical
attacks, the traditional threat to the telecommuni-
50 See id. at B-2. (defining incapacitation as "an abnor-
mal condition when the level of products and services a criti-
cal infrastructure provides its customers is reduced. While
typically a temporary condition, an infrastructure is consid-
ered incapacitated when the duration of reduced perform-
ance causes a debilitating impact.").
51 See id. at B-1 (defining debilitated as "a condition of
defense or economic security characterized by ineffectual-
ness").
52 See ALAN STONE, How AMERICA GOT ON-LINE: POLITICS,
MARKETS, AND THE REVOLUTION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 141
(1997) (describing the expansion of cellular and satellite ser-
vice in the 1980's).
53 See Ralph J. Andreotta, The National Information Infra-
structure: Its Implications, Opportunities, and Challenges, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 221, 224 (1995).
54 See generally, STONE, supra note 52, at 143-48.
55 See id.
56 See id., at 185-86 (describing the operation of the In-
ternet through the use of different sites to send parts of a
single message or packet of data).
57 See id.
58 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at A-5 (describing
vulnerabilities associated with a connectionless data packet
network).
59 See Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2334-35 (1997) (stating that
"cyberspace" consists of methods that transmit text, sound,
pictures and video images via e-mail, chat rooms and sites on
the World Wide Web that, while located in no particular loca-
tion, can be accessed by anyone with access to the Internet
with anominity).
60 See generally PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at A-4-A-7
(discussing vulnerabilities to the NIl in the areas of PSTN
switching, transport of data, signalling between intermediate
data transfer points, and control and management of data).
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cations system and beyond the scope of this
work, 61 remain a continuing threat to the indus-
try. Cyber-based threats, on the other hand, have
increased as the volume of use and complexity of
the system has grown.62 System reliability has,
however, remained high because of cooperation
between the Federal Communications Commis-
sion and service providers. 63
Deliberate attacks designed to steal, modify or
destroy data have increasingly emerged as threats
to the viability of the systems as it presently ex-
ists. 6 4  Insiders constitute the largest known
source of security threat to the telecommunica-
tions systems using cyberspace methods of at-
tack. 65 However, equally troublesome to the tele-
communications industry is the threat of well
organized outside attacks by national intelligence
organizations, military information warfare
units,6 6 criminals, and industrial competitors. 67
Attacks may come in the form of destruction, al-
61 See Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges
for Public International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L LJ. 272, 289
(1996) (dividing the potential threats to the NII into two
clearly definable spheres - those which are physical in nature
and those which are electronic or "cyber" based).
62 See id. at 283-84 (explaining how the increased depen-
dence on information technology by society has increased
the need to attack a nation's NII in future international con-
flicts).
63 See generally ROBERT L. HILLIARD, THE FEDERAL COMMU-
NICATIONS COMMISSION: A PRIMER, 48-58 (1991) (detailing the
activities of the Federal Communication Commission's Com-
mon Carrier and Field Operations Bureaus in conjunction
with service providers to maintain reliability of the PSTN).
64 There are many realistic threats to the information in-
frastructures, including malicious insiders, and intruders, ter-
rorists, saboteurs, and incompetent administrative and opera-
tional staff, in addition to effects of the environment, natural
phenomena, accidental interference, and so on. These
threats may come from corporate, national, or terrorist inter-
ests as well as individuals. The list of threats is long and mul-
tidimensional. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Information
Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose
Increasing Risks, Rep. No. GAO/AIMD-96-84, at 12-14
(1996); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Information
Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose
Increasing Risks, Testimony Before The Permanent Subcom-
mittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmen-
tal Affairs, Rep. No. GAO/T-AIMD-96-92, at 2 (1996) (State-
ment of Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, General Accounting
Office Defense Information and Financial Management Sys-
tems, Accounting and Information Management Division).
65 See generally, PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at A-4 (stat-
ing that insiders with access to networks currently constitute
the largest known security threat to the NII).
66 Development and research on effective information
warfare capabilities is not limited to the United States mili-
tary. Based upon available information from non-classified
sources it an readily be determined that:
teration, remote unauthorized control or the shut
down communications systems. 68 This situation is
intensified by deregulation of the telecommunica-
tions industry,69 resulting in the expansion of ac-
cess points, 70 increasing reliance upon automated
systems to reduce costs7' and easier access to sen-
sitive data and functions comprise the backbone
of the system. 72 With network elements increas-
ingly reliant upon each other, attacks simultane-
ously targeting multiple sites and functions are
highly difficult to defend against, particularly if
they coincide with physical destruction of sup-
porting systems in the telecommunications infra-
structure.
73
2. Transportation
The transportation infrastructure in the United
States consists of the vast network of highways,
railroads, pipelines, ports and inland waterways,
we are not alone in developing information warfare
weapons. Other nations are not only watching our ac-
tions, but developing their own doctrines and contin-
gencies as well. Americans may take some comfort from
our current lead in advanced computer chip produc-
tion, but other nations are close behind... Other coun-
tries can take advantage of much of the information
revolution that the United States has invested heavily in,
without bearing any of the costs.
See INST. FOR NAT'L STRATEGIC STUDIES, STRATEGIC ASSESS-
MENT 1995 - U.S. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN TRANSITION, (1994)
quoted in Hanseman, supra note 29, at 190-91
67 See James Adams, THE NEXT WORLD WAR, 259-62
(1998) (describing efforts by French intelligence agencies to
gain access to U.S. industrial secrets during the early 1990's).
68 See Andreotta, supra note 53, at 223-24 (stating that the
private sector will continue to be responsible for leading fu-
ture development of the NII through competitive environ-
ments and that hundreds of companies of all sizes must strive
to satisfy the vast and varying array of consumer wants and
needs).
69 See generally The Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub.L.No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (deregulating tele-
communications services).
70 See In re: Implementation of Local Competition provi-
sions in The Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report
and Order 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (1996) (stating that the three
principal goals of the 1996 Act are the opening of local ex-
change and local access markets to competition, promoting
increased competition in all telecommunications markets
and preserving universal service during the transition to
open competition).
71 See id.
72 See STONE, supra note 52, at 188-89 (describing the de-
velopment of the World Wide Web and the increased accessi-
bility to information which has resulted from its widespread
use).
73 See ADAMS, supra note 67, at 189-90.
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airports, and air traffic control systems which the
nation relies upon to facilitate the efficient move-
ment of goods, services and people on both do-
mestic and international routes.74 Assurance of
the continued viability of this system is critical to
the continued health of the economy and na-
tional security, particularly in the areas of air traf-
fic control, 75 ports and waterway safety,7 6 and the
Global Positioning System.7 7 These elements of
the transportation system, previously reliant pri-
marily on non-electronic methods of operation,
have become increasingly dependent on com-
puter-controlled systems.78  The continued con-
solidation of the transportation industry in sectors
such as air transport, railroads, seaborne trans-
port and trucking has reduced the number of
routes used by the transportation industry
through the consolidation of distribution centers,
compounding redundancy deficiencies in the
event of failure of a critical component. 79 The in-
creasing congestion at selected points in the trans-
portation system also results in pressure on gov-
74 Transportation is defined by the PCCIP as
A critical infrastructure characterized by the physical dis-
tribution system critical to supporting the national secur-
ity and economic well-being of this nation, including the
national airspace system, airlines and aircraft, and air-
ports; roads and highways, trucking and personal vehi-
cles; ports and waterways and the vessels operating
thereon; mass transit, both rail and bus; pipelines, in-
cluding gas, petroleum, and other hazardous materials;
freight and long haul passenger rail; and delivery serv-
ices.
See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 67, at B-3.
75 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR TRAFFIC CON-
TROL: WEAK COMPUTER SECURITY PRACTICES JEPORDIZE FLIGHT
SAFETY, Rep. No. GAO/AIMD-98-155, at 2 (1998) (hereinaf-
ter "Rep. No. GAO/AIMD-98-155") (describing the ineffec-
tiveness of Federal Aviation Administration security for infor-
mation systems and stating that it was in violation of its own
policy during a review conducted for the FAA's Office of Civil
Aviation in October, 1996 because it had performed the nec-
essary analysis to determine threats, vulnerabilities and safe-
guards for only 3 of 90 operational air traffic control com-
puter systems, less then four percent).
76 See generally Keeping All Channels Open, THE ECONOMIST,
Sept. 12-18, 1998, at 28-29 (describing the missions of the
U.S. Coast Guard and its roles in law enforcement and ad-
ministrative law).
77 See Global Positioning System (visited Nov. 11, 1998)
<http://www.msl.jpl.nasa.gov/Programs/gps.html> (describ-
ing the operation of the 24 satellites which make up this navi-
gation system).
78 See PCCIP Report, supra note, 15 at A-12 (1997).
79 See id.
80 Attention must be paid to air traffic control systems
when discussing Nil security. This federally run system is cur-
rently undergoing modernization, resulting in increased reli-
ernment systems, particularly those connected to
the air traffic control system.80 Additionally,
there is a marked absence of security assurance
against attacks on the NII systems upon which the
transportation infrastructure depends."' This
congestion and lack of security, combined with a
general lack of awareness sharply limits the gov-
ernment's ability to counter even a limited NI
disruption in the transportation industry.
3. Vital Human Services
Vital human services provided by government
entities consist of three critical NII components:
(1) water supply; 2 (2) emergency services;8 3 and
(3) government services.8 4 Unlike other Nil com-
ponents, the majority of these services are main-
tained at the state and local levels and are primar-
ily concerned with basic human needs and
safety.8 5 This highly decentralized system of con-
trols raises the possibility that failures would be lo-
calized to a specific geographical area should they
ance on the exchange of information from remotely located
parts of the system. See id. Current systems are primarily self
contained, based upon voice communications and physical
handoffs of aircraft between communications centers avoid
problems connected with disruption if the NII. See id. Fu-
ture plans, however, call for the Global Positioning System of
satellites to become the nation's sole radionavigation system
by 2010, leading to exclusive reliance on a satellite-based sys-
tem to control air traffic. This reliance raises the potential for
disruptions at a single point in the air traffic control system
to effect the entire system. See Ed Hazelwood, Air Traffic Con-
trol Outlook: FAA Considers Backup for GPS, 148:5 AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH. 58 (1998).
81 See Rep. No. GAO/AIMD-98-155, supra note 75, at 11
82 See PCCIP REPORT supra note 15, at B-4 (defining water
supply systems as "a critical infrastructure characterized by
the sources of water, reservoirs and holding facilities, aque-
ducts and other transport systems, the pipelines, the cooling
systems and other delivery mechanisms that provide for do-
mestic and industrial applications, including systems for deal-
ing with water runoff, waste water, and fire-fighting.").
83 See id. (defining emergency services as "critical infra-
structure characterized by medical, police, fire, and rescue
systems and personnel that are called upon when an individ-
ual or community is responding to emergencies. These serv-
ices are typically provided at [the county or metropolitan
area] level. In addition, state and Federal response plans de-
fine emergency support functions to assist in response and
recovery").
84 See id. at B-2 (defining government services as "suffi-
cient capabilities at the Federal, state and local levels of gov-
ernment are required to meet the needs for essential services
to the public").
85 See id. at A-44 (describing the differences between vital
human services infrastructures and other critical infrastruc-
tures).
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occur.86 However, a loss of confidence in the gov-
ernment's ability to maintain these systems in
times of crisis and the possible interstate effects of
failure necessitates their inclusion in the NI as
critical infrastructures.
87
4. Energy
All information infrastructures depend on the
availability of energy to operate. Of particular
concern when discussing energy and the NiI is
the vulnerability of electric power systems,88 oil
and gas refining and transmission facilities.8 9
Many private entities providing energy services
are attempting to minimize costs and increase ef-
ficiency through the increased use of automa-
tion.90 Compromising these control systems could
lead to widespread disruption of services and
physical destruction of equipment vital to recov-
ery efforts. An effective method to facilitate such
a breakdown is to alter or disrupt the information
and control systems used to operate major com-
ponents of the systems. 91 Currently, there is little
awareness within private industry on information
security and the consequences of a compromise
in security of operating systems. 92 This results in
the use of NII based systems to control various as-
pects of the energy production process from raw
materials production to power generation and re-
fining processes. 93 The increased use of industry-
86 See id.
87 See generally PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at A-48-A-53
(demonstrating that emergency services rely heavily on com-
puter controlled PSTN systems for dispatch of appropriate
first responders, coordination, incident containment and the
emergency 911 system. This results in the possibility that
emergency services could be future targets of outside groups
or individuals purposely or indirectly while attacking another
part of the NIl).
88 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at B-2 (defining elec-
trical power systems as "a critical infrastructure characterized
by generation stations, transmission and distribution net-
works that create and supply electricity to end-users so that
end-users achieve and maintain normal functionality, includ-
ing the transportation and storage of fuel essential to that
system").
89 See id. (defining gas and oil production, storage and
transportation as "a critical infrastructure characterized by
the production and holding facilities for natural gas, crude
and refined petroleum, and petroleum-derived fuels, the re-
fining and processing facilities for these fuels and the pipe-
lines, ships, trucks, and rail systems that transport these com-
modities from their source to systems that are dependent
upon gas and oil in one of their useful forms").
90 See Karl Rabago, Information Technology: It's Not Just
Business Anymore, 134 FORT. 23, 24-25 (1996) (describing the
wide systems for coordination of supplies, the cen-
tralization of previously dispersed control systems
and dependence on the use of the PSTN raise the
possibility that the breakdown of one system due
to attack could disrupt service throughout the en-
tire energy distribution infrastructure.9 4
5. Banking and Finance
Banking and finance infrastructures 95 of con-
cern to the NII include banks, financial service
companies, payment systems, investment compa-
nies and securities and commodities exchanges. 96
The banking and financial sector is the most se-
cure component of the critical NII because theft
prevention mechanisms and systems for recording
transactions ensure its reliability and provide re-
dundancy in the event of unauthorized access. 97
At the operational level, however, reliance on
non-U.S. information infrastructures for interna-
tional fund transfers and securities trading, as well
as dependence on the telecommunications and
energy industries to facilitate all financial trans-
fers create vulnerabilities because they allow ac-
cess to the NIl by parties which may not observe
the same standards of security as those located in
the United States. 98
Furthermore, a reluctance to share information
dealing with cyber attacks and protection meth-
ods exists within the industry and between govern-
increased use of technology by the energy industry to maxi-
mize efficiency).
91 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 11, at 12.
92 See id. at A-29-A-30.
93 See generally id.
94 See generally id.
95 The PCCIP Report describes banking and finance as a
critical infrastructure characterized by:
Entities, such as retail and commercial organizations, in-
vestment institutions, exchange boards, trading houses,
and reserve systems, and associated operational organi-
zations, government operations, and support activities,
that are involved in all manner of monetary transactions,
including its investment for income purposes, its ex-
change for payment purposes and its disbursement in
the form of loans and other financial instruments.
See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 11, at B-1.
96 See generally, Mike Plonien, Electronic Commerce on the In-
ternet, 68 CPA JOURNAL 82 (1998) (describing the various
kinds of electronic commerce available via Internet sources).
97 See The Role of Computer Security in Protecting U.S. Infra-
structure: Hearing Before the U.S. House Comm. on Science, Sub-
committee on Technology, 10 51h Cong. 37, 39 (1998) (statement
of Stephen R. Katz, Chief Information Security Officer, Ci-
tibank, N.A.).
98 See id.
[Vol. 7
Under Siege
ment authorities because of the fear that public
confidence will undermined. 99 Reporting is gen-
erally compartmentalized and few trusted meth-
ods exist for sharing the kinds of information
needed to make an overall assessment of what the
result of a coordinated attack would be. 100
III. INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
INITIATIVES AND ORGANIZATIONS
A. National Security Directive No. 42
One of the earliest unclassified documents
describing preparations to protect the NII by the
defense and intelligence communities is National
Security Directive No. 42 ("NSD 42").101 This
document, dated July 5, 1990, "National Policy for
the Security of National Security Telecommunica-
tions and Information Systems," established the
initial objectives, policies, and organizational
structures to prevent the compromise of secure
national security systems and disseminate infor-
mation to affected government agencies.' 0 2 Spe-
cifically, NSD 42 created the National Security
Telecommunications and Information Systems Se-
curity Committee ("NTISSC"), an inter-agency
policy coordinating committee to oversee imple-
99 The PCCIP Report defines trust as that:
. . bestowed by citizens based on demonstrations and
expectations of 1) Their government's ability to provide
for their common defense and economic security and
behave consistent with the interests of society; and 2)
Their critical infrastructures' ability to provide products
and services at expected levels and to behave consistent
with their customers' best interests.
See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 11, at B-3
100 See id. at A-40.
101 National Policy for the Security of National Security Tele-
communications and Information Systems, National Security Di-
rective 42,July 5, 1990 (hereinafter "NSD 42") (redacted doc-
ument released April 1, 1992 in response to Freedom of
Information Act request under DOD case number 90-FOI-
1584/m).
102 See id. (stating that the directive establishes initial
objectives of policies, and an organizational structure to
guide the conduct of activities to secure national security sys-
tems from exploitation; establishes a mechanism for policy
development and dissemination; and assigns responsibilities
for implementation through insuring full participation and
cooperation among the various existing centers of technical
expertise throughout the Executive branch, while recogniz-
ing the special requirements for protection of intelligence
sources and methods).
103 The NTISSC was established to consider technical
matters and develop policies, procedures, guidelines, instruc-
tions and standards as necessary to implement provisions of
NSD 42. See id. at §5(a). The Committee is chaired by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Com-
mentation and coordination of various activities
associated with Nil protection. 10 3
At the operational level, the NTISSC oversees
all activities utilizing the NII which affect national
security. 10 4 These roles include: (1) development
of specific operating policies, procedures, guide-
lines and priorities for implementation of NSD
42;105 (2) presentation of an annual report to the
Executive branch on the status of national secur-
ity information systems; 10 6 (3) control of the re-
lease of cryptography technology to foreign gov-
ernments or international organizations;' 0 7 and
(4) the maintenance of a national system for
promulgating operational policies, instructions
and guidance pursuant to the goals of NSD 42.108
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command
Control, Communications and Intelligence ("ASD
C;I"), directly subordinate to the Secretary of De-
fense, is chairperson of the NTISSC and conducts
liaison activities with the intelligence community
through the National Security Council. 109
The Department of Defense seized an early role
in Nil protection activities after it found itself the
target of many of the original unauthorized entry
attempts. 110 The creation of NTISSC provided a
forum for discussion of policy issues relating to
munications and Intelligence and is composed of a voting
representatives from the Secretaries of State, Treasury, De-
fense, Transportation, Energy, the Office of Management
and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Secur-
ity Affairs, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and each of the armed services, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation; the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the General Services Administration, National Secur-
ity Agency, the National Communications System, the De-
fense Intelligence Agency and the Attorney General. See id.
104 See id.
105 See id. at §5(b)(1).
106 See id. at §5(b)(3).
107 See id. at §5(b)(4).
108 See id. at §5(b)(5).
109 See generally id. at §5(d) (stating that the Committee
has a permanent secretariat composed of personnel of the
National Security Agency and other personnel from Execu-
tive departments and agencies as requested by the Chair-
man).
110 See Robert G. Hanseman, The Realities and Legalities of
Information Warfare, 42 A.F. L. REv. 173, 192-93. (stating that
the Defense Information Systems Agency has estimated that
Defense department Computers were attacked at least
250,000 times in 1995, that these attacks were successful 65%
of the time, and the number of attacks has been doubling
each year). The Defense Information Infrastructure ("DII")
is "the web of communications networks, computers,
software, databases, applications, weapon system interfaces,
data, security services, and other services that meet the infor-
mation processing and transport needs of Department of De-
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systems that process classified information or in-
formation involving intelligence activities, na-
tional security and critical military or intelligence
missions. 11 Concern over the increasing vulnera-
bility of the overall NII resulted in the ASD C;I
commissioning of the RAND study detailed
above. 112 While this office is primarily concerned
with defense related portions of the NII, the ap-
pearance of an expanded threat to the NII due to
increased reliance on information systems, called
for a government-wide assessment of what should
be done to assess the situation. 13
B. Executive Orders No. 12,864 and No. 13,010
Outside of the Department of Defense, the
Clinton Administration established of the Na-
tional Telecommunications and Information Ad-
ministration ("NTIA") at the Commerce Depart-
ment to coordinate non-National Security related
fense ("DOD") users, across the range of military opera-
tions." See DEFENSE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE MASTER
PLAN: OVERVIEW, VERSION 7.0 at 2-1 (1998). The DII encom-
passes; (1) DOD-wide information systems, and interfaces to
weapons systems; (2) physical facilities; (3) the applications
and data engineering tools that allow users to access, manip-
ulate, organize, and digest information; (4) standards and
protocols that facilitate networks; and (5) people and assets
that provide DII management and operation. See id.
I1I See NSD 42, supra note 102, at §5(b)(1).
112 See supra, note 12 (describing the mission of the
RAND Corporation). See Molander, supra note 14 at 6-9
(describing the RAND Corporation study regarding the vul-
nerability of the NII to attack).
113 SeeJAMES ADAMS, THE NEXT WORLD WAR 176 (Simon
& Schuster, 1998) ("Whatjolted the administration into ac-
tion was an exercise carried out for the Secretary of Defense
by the RAND Corporation.... For the first time an adminis-
tration learned that hacking might be more than just a nui-
sance to be dealt with by the police. Instead, it learned, it
could pose a potent threat to the national security of the
United States.").
114 On September 15, 1993, the administration released
an "Agenda for Action" for the NIl. It describes the role of
NTIA as promoting the development of the telecommunica-
tions and information infrastructure connecting the nation's
businesses, residences, schools health care facilities and pub-
lic information providers through advanced, interactive,
high-speed networks. See generally The National Information
Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025
(1993); see also generally, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS and
Information Administration, Office of Telecommunications
and Information Applications, Connecting the Nation: Class-
rooms, Libraries, and health care Organizations in the Infor-
mation Age (1996) (hereinafter, "CONNECTING THE NATION")
(describing initiatives to connect educational and health care
organizations to the NII and other activities by NTIA).
115 See The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda
for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025, 49,035-36 (1993).
aspects of Nil policy.1 4 This organization, and an
advisory council1 5 consisting of thirty-seven'
1 6
members of the public and private sectors, was
given a mandate to create NII policy. 117 Unlike
NTISSC's emphasis on security, this initiative en-
couraged job creation, economic growth, in-
creased productivity and improved quality of life
through utilization of the NII.1 18 The NTIA
sought to connect industry, residences, schools,
health care facilities and government agencies
through high-speed links in the NII. 119
The NTIA was established with the recognition
that major parts of the NII would be developed by
the private sector, with the government comple-
menting these efforts.120 These roles were specifi-
cally outlined in both Executive Order 12,864, es-
tablishing the advisory council for NTIA12 1 and a
supplementary Federal Register notice entitled
"The National Information Infrastructure:
Agenda for Action."' 22 The initiative recognized
116 See Exec. Order No. 12,890, 59 Fed. Reg. 499 (1993)
(expanding the Executive Committee of NTIA from 25 to 30
members); see also Exec. Order No. 12,921, 59 Fed. Reg.
30,667 (1993) (expanding the Executive Committee of NTIA
to 37 members).
117 The Advisory Council was to advise the Secretary of
Commerce on matters related to the development of the NII.
These issues included:
(1) the appropriate roles of the private and public sec-
tors in developing the NII; (2) a vision for the evolution
of the NII and its public and commercial applications;
(3) the impact of current and proposed regulatory re-
gimes on the evolution of the NII; (4) national strategies
for maximizing the benefits of the NIl, as measured by
job creation, economic growth, increased productivity,
and enhanced quality of life; (5) national strategies for
developing and demonstrating applications in areas
such as electronic commerce, agile manufacturing, life-
long learning, health care, government services and civic
networking; (6) national security, emergency prepared-
ness, system security, and network protection implica-
tions; (7) national strategies for maximizing intercon-
nection and interoperability of communications
networks; (8) international issues associated with the
NII; (9) universal access; and (10) privacy, security and
copyright issues.
See Executive Order No. 12,864, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,773 at §2(b)
(hereinafter "Exec. Order No. 12,864").
I18 See generally CONNECTING THE NATION, supra note 114,
at 16-17 (1996) (discussing the programs initiated by NTIA
to assist increased Internet connection).
119 See Exec. Order No. 12,864, supra note 118.
120 See CONNECTING THE NATION, supra note 119, at 2
(emphasizing NTIA's role in connecting public institutions
and the underprivileged, while encouraging public-private
investments).
121 See CONNECTING THE NATION, supra note 119, at §1.
122 The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for
Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025 (1993).
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that these initiatives would aid the ability of U.S.
firms to compete in the global economy while
eliminating the constraints which had previously
limited growth.123 Additionally, expanded use of
the NII would improve access to government serv-
ices and aid in the Administration's Reinventing
Government initiatives. 124
Increasing accessibility to the Nil was not the
only issue confronting the agency. Early concerns
about privacy rights, 1 25 intellectual property12 6
and NII security127 were identified as priority mis-
sions to be addressed. Reliability, another matter
incorporated into NTIA's mandate, was addressed
in cooperation with the Federal Communication
Commission's Network Reliability Counci 1 28 and
the NTISSC.' 29 In this role, NTIA was able to en-
courage the rapid expansion of the NII through-
out the early and mid-1990's, resulting in the NII
in place today.
NTIA's work and the effects of private industry
initiatives in utilizing the NII for the operation of
many critical infrastructures raised has concerns
about NII security. 130 When the NTIA policy state-
ment was released, the primary threat to the NII
was impediments to growth due to the lack of dig-
ital and high capacity access services in the
123 See id. (stating that limits on growth of industry previ-
ously imposed by geographical location have been elimi-
nated because of increased ability to communicate utilizing
the NII).
124 See id. at 49,029.
125 See generally id. at 49,030 (demonstrating the neces-
sary balance between the private sector's need for access to
secure communications while utilizing the NII and the pres-
ervation of the ability of government agencies to investigate
illegal activities); see also id. at 49,029 (mandating that NITA
review encryption technologies to protect the privacy of citi-
zens utilizing the NII).
126 See Exec. Order No. 12,864, supra note 118, at
§2 (b) (10).
127 See id. at §2(b)(6).
128 The Federal Communications Commission's Network
Reliability and Interoperability Council ("the Council") was
chartered in 1996 by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to
study network reliability, interconnection, emerging technol-
ogies and essential communications during emergencies. See
Pub.L.No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 47 U.S.C. §256 (Coordina-
tion for interconnectivity). The Council's work builds upon
that completed by its predecessor, the Network Reliability
Council, first organized by the FCC in 1992, to study causes
of service outages and develop recommendations based
upon its findings. The Council is composed of 35 CEO-level
representatives of telecommunications carriers, manufactur-
ers, state regulators and consumers. See generally NETwoRK RE-
LIABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL, OFFICE OF ENGI-
NEERING AND TECHNOLOGY, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, NRIC NETWORK INTEROPERABILITY: THE KEY TO
PSTN.' 3 1 By 1995, when RAND and NTISSC
staged the information warfare exercise described
earlier, 13 2 vulnerabilities in the security of the NII
became apparent. Along with these vulnerabili-
ties, came the realization that individuals began
exploiting the expanded access to the NII for
their own purposes. 133 While none of these unau-
thorized entries resulted in more than nominal
damage to any one part of the NII, it became
clear that much more needed to be done to keep
the Nil secure.1 3 4
These concerns resulted in Executive Order
No. 13,010.135 Promulgated on July 15, 1996, this
Order established the PCCIP to evaluate the po-
tential threats then existing to the critical compo-
nents of the NIL.'3 6 Threats were divided into two
categories: physical and cyber. Physical threats in-
cluded those using conventional or unconven-
tional weapons to damage components of the NII,
while the "cyber" threats were described as those
emanating from the use of electronic, radio-fre-
quency or computer-based attacks on the infor-
mation or communications components that con-
trol critical infrastructures. 137 In addition, the
PCCIP for the first time brought together mem-
bers from defense, intelligence, commerce, law
COMPETITION (1997) (describing the activities of the Network
Reliability and Interoperability Council).
129 See NSD 42, supra note 103.
130 See Molander, supra note 14, at 1-3.
131 See 58 Fed. Reg. at 49,029 (stating the need for mod-
ernization of the telecommunications infrastructure to ac-
commodate increased use by public and private actors).
132 See supra note 12.
133 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION SE-
CURITY: COMPUTER HACKER INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON THE
INTERNET, Rep. No. GAO/T-AIMD-96-108, at 2 (1996) (testi-
mony before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions, Committee on Governmental Affairs by Jack L. Brock,
Director, Defense Information an Financial Management Sys-
tems and Keith A. Rhodes, technical Assistant Director, Of-
fice of the Chief Scientist, Accounting and Management Divi-
sion) (hereinafter "Rep. No. GAO/T-AIMD-96-108")
(describing the reasons which hackers seek unauthorized ac-
cess and the potential threat to national security posed by
hackers). See Paul Van Slambrouck, Cyber threats: How Serious?
Teenage Hacker's Breach of Pentagon Computer Site Points to Grow-
ing Problem of Break-ins and Cyberterrorism, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, March 9, 1998, at 1 (exploring the motivations of
hackers).
134 See generally Henry H. Perritt, et. al., Computer Crimes
Now on the Books: What Do We Do From Here?, 70 TEMP. L. REv.
1199 (1997).
135 See Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347
(1996).
136 See id.
137 See id.; see also PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at 18.
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enforcement and private industry to discuss NII
protection policy.' 38 Previous efforts to define
and shape the NII had been divided exclusively
into civilian and military areas.13 9 Increased com-
monality between uses of the NII and shared de-
pendence on its attributes prompted a change in
policy and increased cooperation at all levels by
the summer of 1995.140
The PCCIP was charged with the mission of de-
fining issues important to NII protection' 4 1 and
consulting with areas of the public and private
sectors interested in NII assurance issues. 142 The
group would also assume a lead role in the coordi-
nation of actions of infrastructure protection 143
efforts during its policy development phase. Be-
cause of need to increase coordination between
the then existing infrastructure protection efforts
(centered in the NTISSC and NTIA), Executive
Order 13,010 created the Infrastructure Protec-
tion Task Force ("IPTF") within the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation 14 4 and overseen by PC-
CIP.145
The IPTF's interim coordination mission prior
to the final PCCIP report was to provide, facilitate
and coordinate the provision of expert guidance
to critical infrastructures within the NII to halt or
confine an attack while working to restore any
services affected. 146 Also, the IPTF was provided
that authority to facilitate any criminal investiga-
tion resulting from attacks on the NII and have
138 The head of each agency of the following executive
branch departments and agencies nominated two full-time
members of the Commission: (i) Department of the Treas-
ury; (ii) Department ofJustice; (iii) Department of Defense;
(iv) Department of Commerce; (v) Department of Transpor-
tation; (vi) Department of Energy; (vii) Central Intelligence
Agency; (viii) Federal Emergency Management Agency; (ix)
Federal Bureau of Investigation; (x) National Security
Agency. See Exec. Order 13,010 at §1 (b).
139 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 11, at 47-48.
140 See id. at 6.
141 See Executive Order 13,010 at § 4(a).
142 See id. at § 4(b) (stating that interested parties and
organizations in NII protection include those that conduct,
support infrastructure assurance, the owners and operators
of such systems and other groups, including Congress).
143 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at B-2 (describing
infrastructure protection as "Proactive risk management ac-
tions intended to prevent a threat from attempting to or suc-
ceeding at destroying or incapacitating critical infrastruc-
tures. For instance, threat deterrence and vulnerability
defense.").
144 See Exec. Ord. No. 13,010, supra note 136, at §7(a)
(stating that there was an immediate need to establish an In-
frastructure Protection Task Force within the Department of
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the interim, to in-
the ability to call upon other executive branch
agencies for support should the have need
arisen. 47 This structure remained in place until
the PCCIP released its findings and recommenda-
tions in October 1997.
C. The PCCIP Report
On October 13, 1997, the PCCIP presented its
findings to the Clinton Administration. 148 While
the Commission found no evidence that an attack
on the NII's critical components was imminent, it
did find that there was widespread capability to
exploit present weaknesses in the NII and that the
threat posed by these weaknesses was intensify-
ing.149 Its recommendations emphasized coopera-
tion between infrastructure owners and operators,
both inside and outside of the government.1 50
Because of the magnitude of the threat and its
evolving nature this responsibility and the effects
on the NII were deemed to be shared by all
groups utilizing the NIL.15 '
The findings in the PCCIP report noted that
one of the primary features of protection against
infrastructure threats to the United States, that of
geography, has become less relevant. 1 52 Due to
the ease with which computer messages can cross
international boundaries through the use of the
Internet, concepts such as early warning, jurisdic-
tional boundaries and time to assess adversary's
crease coordination of existing infrastructure protection ef-
forts in order to better address, and prevent, crises that
would have a debilitating regional or national impact).
145 See id.
146 The IPTF's function was to:
Identify and coordinate existing expertise, inside and
outside the Federal Government to: (i) provide, or facili-
tate or coordinate the provision of, expert guidance to
critical infrastructures to detect, prevent, halt, or con-
fine attack and to recover and restore service; (ii) issue
threat and warning notices in the event advance infor-
mation is obtained about a threat; (iii) provide training
and education on methods of reducing vulnerabilities
and responding to attacks on critical infrastructures; (iv)
conduct after-action analysis to determine possible fu-
ture threats, targets, or methods of attack; and (v) coor-
dinate with the pertinent law enforcement authorities
during or after an attack to facilitate any resulting crimi-
nal investigation.
See id. at §7(e).
147 See id. at §7(f)-(g).
148 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at i.
149 See id. at 6.
15o See id. at 21.
151 See id. at 19.
152 See id. at 7-8.
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actions had decreased in both scope and rele-
vance. 153 Simulated attacks carried out during
the PCCIP's analysis of the potential for disrup-
tion of the NII revealed vulnerabilities with the
potential to cripple the continued function of the
U.S. government in times of crisis.' 54 As a result
of global integration, the report stated that the
operations of U.S. infrastructures extended well
beyond the ability of any single entity to protect
them.155 New points of entry had been estab-
lished to the critical infrastructure of the U.S.,
providing avenues of attack to adversaries abroad
as well as those located domestically.1 56
The growing irrelevance of geography and
traditional methods of response to criminal or ter-
rorist attacks were not the only factors considered
when examining the vulnerability of the NII. Of
particular significance to the PCCIP was that in
the past 15 years, the number of software control
specialists with the ability to disrupt the NII has
grown from only a few individuals to well over a
million worldwide. 15 7 Additionally, the ease of
availability of the programs which enable those in-
dividuals to conduct unauthorized entries into
critical control systems of the NII has spurred at-
tempts by laypersons to achieve today what could
be achieved only by a skilled professional 10 years
ago.1 58 The PCCIP found that while the introduc-
tion of technology based upon the NII produced
better services at lower cost by both government
and industry, dependence on the continued relia-
bility and existence of the NII was higher the
ever.' 59 Processes used were efficient but lacked
the redundant characteristics that non-NII sys-
tems have in case of failure.'
60
In response to the issues raised by its survey of
the NII, the PCCIP findings reflected the fact that
153 See id.
154 During the summer of 1997, the Department of De-
fense ran an exercise named "Eligible Receiver" to test the
ability of the U.S. military and political structure to withstand
a cyber-based attack. See JAMES ADAMS, THE NEXT WORLD
WAR, 187-90 (1998). The attacks focused on the NII, the mil-
itary and the political leadership. The exercise utilized per-
sonnel outside of the U.S. government who had no knowl-
edge regarding government-run NII systems. See id. In all
cases, the hackers were able to gain access to vital NII systems
and seriously disrupt the ability of the U.S. government to
function during a crisis. See id.; see also Cyber-Invaders Leave
U.S. on Brink of Darkness, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, April 16,
1998, at 12.
155 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 11, at 47-48.
156 See CONNECTING THE NATION, supra note 115.
157 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at 9.
it would disregard the infrastructure protection
approaches used during the Cold War by the fed-
eral government.1 6 1 Compartmentalization of in-
formation and the availability of long periods of
time to analyze potential threats were deemed to
be obsolete for the NII protection mission. 162
The findings contained in the report regarding
security from cyber threats stated that (1) infor-
mation sharing is the most immediate need; 163
(2) responsibility is shared among owners and op-
erators and government; 16 4 (3) NII protection re-
quires integrated capabilities of diverse federal
agencies and special means for coordinating fed-
eral response to ensure these capabilities are
melded together effectively; 165 (4) the challenge
is one of adapting to a changing culture; 166 (5)
the federal government has important roles in the
new infrastructure protection alliance with indus-
try and state and local governments; 167 (6) the ex-
isting legal framework is imperfectly attuned to
deal with cyber threats; 168 and (7) research and
development are not presently adequate to sup-
port infrastructure protection. 169 The conclu-
sions reached by the PCCIP support the conten-
tion that NII protection necessitated the
establishment of a new and unique organization
which would have the flexibility and power to im-
plement them effectively.
D. Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63
A comprehensive response by the Clinton Ad-
ministration to the PCCIP Report was issued on
May 22, 1998 during the commencement address
at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Mary-
land. 170 During the address, President Clinton
unveiled the contents of Presidential Decision Di-
158 See id.
159 See id. at 5.
160 See id. at 38.
161 See id. at 47-48 (stating the need for clear organiza-
tional structures which differ from those used by the govern-
ment since World War II to create policy, assess threats and
respond to crises).
162 See id.
163 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15 at 27.
164 See id. at 35.
165 See id. at 47.
166 See id. at 67.
167 See id. at 73.
168 See id. at 79.
169 See id. at 89.
170 Paul Mann, "Government/Industry Alliance Urged
Against Cyber Threats", Vol. 149, No. 2, AvIATION WEEK AND
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rectives 62171 and 63172 ("PDD 62" and "PDD
63"), aimed at combating unconventional threats
to the critical infrastructures of the United
States.1 73 Based upon the recommendations of
the PCCIP, these two policy statements are the
foundation of the federal government's objective
of protecting the NII.174
In order to deal with the overall threat of ter-
rorist attacks against the United States, PDD 62
discusses the missions and authorities of various
government agencies regarding counter-terrorist
programs currently underway. 17 5 The goal of the
directive is to limit the opportunities available for
attack through increased prevention activities and
create mechanisms for incident response and re-
covery to conventional or unconventional at-
tacks. 176 The importance of this new initiative to
NII protection is found in the establishment of
the Office of the National Coordinator for Secur-
ity, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terror-
ism ("National Coordinator") within the National
Security Council. 177 The role of the National Co-
ordinator will be to oversee the implementation
of policies 78 in areas such as counter-terrorism,
protection of critical infrastructure, preparedness
SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 65 (1997).
171 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact
Sheet on Presidential Decision Directive 62, <http://www.
whitehouse.gov/WH/html.library.html> (visited Nov. 22,
1998) (hereinafter "Fact Sheet on PDD 62').
172 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, The
White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Deci-
sion Directive 63, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/
html.library.html> (visited Nov. 22, 1998) (hereinafter "White
Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection").
173 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact
Sheet and Summary of Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63
(1998) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/html.library.
html> (visited Nov. 22, 1998).
174 See id.
175 See Fact Sheet on PDD 62, supra note 173.
176 See id. (describing the roles of the National Coordina-
tor for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Ter-
rorism within the framework of the National Security Coun-
cil).
177 PDD-62 establishes the Office of the National Coordi-
nator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-
Terrorism overseeing a variety of relevant policies and pro-
grams including such areas as counter-terrorism, protection
of critical infrastructure, preparedness and consequence
management for weapons of mass destruction. See id. The
National Coordinator works within the National Security
Council, reports to the President through the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs and produces an an-
nual Security Preparedness Report. See id. The National Co-
ordinator also provides advice regarding budgets for counter-
terrorism programs and develops of guidelines that might be
needed for crisis management. See id.
and response management in the event of the use
of a weapon of mass destruction 179 in the United
States.
As opposed to PDD 62's coverage of a wide vari-
ety of threats, PDD 63 directly describes the Clin-
ton Administration's policy for critical NII protec-
tion. It declares that the United States shall
create an initial capability to protect the NII from
disruption by the year 2000 and that by 2002 this
capability will be transformed into an effective de-
fense. 180 This critical infrastructure protection ca-
pability is to be designed to prevent disruption of
the federal government's ability to provide for na-
tional security and general health and public
safety, ensure that state and local governments are
able to maintain minimum services while also en-
suring the continued availability of privately
owned parts of the critical NII.
To achieve these declared goals, PDD 63 estab-
lished a four part organizational structure. First,
each part of the NII will be assigned to a "Lead
Agency" responsible for working with private par-
ties to develop and implement a vulnerability
awareness and education program.181  "Lead
Agencies for Special Functions" are designated to
178 See id.
179 See also, 18 U.S.C. §2332a(c)(2) (B)-(C) (1994) (de-
fining the term "weapon of mass destruction" as "any weapon
that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic
or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors; or any weapon
involving a disease organism; or any weapon that is designed
to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to
human life").
180 See White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion, supra note 172. PDD 63 states that:
No later then the year 2000, the United States shall have
achieved an initial operating capability and no later then
five years from the day the President signed Presidential
Decision Directive 63 the United States shall have
achieved and shall maintain the ability to protect our na-
tion's critical infrastructures from intentional acts that
would significantly diminish the abilities of: the federal
Government to perform essential national security mis-
sions and to ensure the general public health and safety;
state and local governments to maintain order and de-
liver minimum essential public services; the private sec-
tor to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy
and the delivery of essential telecommunications, en-
ergy, financial and transportation services.
See id.
181 For each information sector that could be a target for
significant cyber or physical attacks, a single U.S. government
department is designated to serve as Lead Agency for Sector
Liaison regarding NII issues. Together, the Lead Agency and
the private sector counterparts are to develop and imple-
ment a Vulnerability Awareness and Education Program for
their sector. See id.
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coordinate activities relating to Nil protection for
special functions which are performed exclusively
by the federal government, such as national de-
fense and intelligence.1 8 2 Representatives of Lead
Agencies and Lead Agencies for Special Functions
meet on a regular basis under the auspices of a
Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group
("CICG"), chaired by the National Coordina-
tor.18 3 Finally, a National Infrastructure Assur-
ance Council was established.18 4 This advisory
council consists of representatives of major infra-
structure providers, state and local representatives
who are to advise the CICG on matters affecting
non-federal infrastructures.18 5
Outside of the advisory and coordination tasks
described, PDD 63 imminently authorized the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to create
a National Infrastructure Protection Center'8 6
("NIPC") to. provide warning of an imminent at-
tack on the NII, building upon the work of the
IPTF.1 7 For the first time, efforts to protect the
NII have been given the ability to bring together
all parts of the civilian and military resources
available in a single organization. With elements
responsible for warning, analysis, computer inves-
tigation, coordinating emergency response, train-
ing and application of technical tools, it has a
much broader mandate to accomplish the NII
protection mission than either NTISSC or
182 Certain functions, such as national defense and for-
eign affairs, related to critical infrastructure protection are
chiefly performed by the Federal Government. See id. For
each of these special functions, there shall be a Lead Agency
for Special Function which will be responsible for coordinat-
ing all of the activities of the United States Government in
that area. See id.
183 The Sector Liaison Officials and Functional Coor-
dinators of the Lead Agencies, as well as representatives from
other relevant departments and agencies, including the Na-
tional Economic Council, will meet to coordinate the imple-
mentation of this directive under the auspices of a Critical
Infrastructure Coordination Group, chaired by the National
Coordinator. See id.
184 See id. (stating that the National Infrastructure As-
surance Council is to meet periodically to enhance the part-
nership of the public and private sectors in protecting critical
infrastructures and will provides reports to the President).
185 See id..
186 The NIPC includes elements from the FBI, US Secret
Service, and other organizations experienced in computer
crimes and infrastructure protection, as well as representa-
tives detailed from the Department of Defense, the intelli-
gence community and Lead Agencies. The NIPC is linked
electronically to the rest of the federal government, includ-
ing other warning and operations centers, as well as any pri-
vate sector sharing and analysis centers. See id. The NIPC's
mission is to include providing timely warnings of interna-
NITA.188
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT STATE
OF JURISDICTIONAL AND
INTERAGENCY EFFECTIVENESS IN
PROTECTING THE Nil
A. Current Law
The current state of the law regarding protec-
tion of the Nil is defined by the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act of 1984 (the "Act"),189 as amended
by the National Information Infrastructure Pro-
tection Act of 1996.190 Congress' amendment by-
passed the traditional methods of attempting to
adapt existing laws to newly emerging offenses in-
volving Nil protection.191 Additionally, because
the Nil encompasses more than federally-owned
systems, statutory construction had to encompass
unauthorized access to non-federal government
computer systems. 19 2
The need to defend against newly emerging
threats affecting NII resulted in the addition of
Section 1030, entitled "Fraud and related activity
in connection with computers."'1 3 Statutory of-
fenses occur whenever intentional unauthorized
access takes place for the purpose of obtaining fi-
nancial data,'9 4 classified government informa-
tional threats, comprehensive analyses and law enforcement
investigation and response and includes elements responsi-
ble for warning, analysis, computer investigation, coordinat-
ing emergency response, training, outreach and develop-
ment and application of technical tools. See id.
187 See Exec. Ord. No. 13,010, supra note 136, at §7 (stat-
ing that the NIPC consists of members from the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the Department of
Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Se-
curity Agency, and the Lead Agencies).
188 See NSD 42, supra note 101 (describing the NTISSC's
primary goal of protecting the DII); see CONNECTING THE NA-
TION, supra note 114, (describing NTIA's mandate to increase
access to the NIl, as opposed to increasing its security).
189 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. 101-
73, codified as 18 U.S.C. §1030 (1994).
lOO National Information Infrastructure Protection Act
of 1996, Pub. L. 105-175, -Stat. -, (1998).
191 See Sheri A. Dillon, et. al., Computer Crimes, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 503, 508 (1998).
192 See generally Jo-Ann M. Adams, Comment, Controlling
Cyberspace: Applying the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to the In-
ternet, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 403, 419-
20 (1996) (describing the need for more elaborate govern-
ment regulation of the uses of the Internet).
193 See generally 18 U.S.C. §1030 (regarding fraud and re-
lated activity in connection with computers).
194 See 18 U.S.C. §1030(a) (4).
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tion' 95 or any information from "any protected
computer involved in interstate or foreign com-
munication."' 9 6 Unauthorized access to a com-
puter system that affects its use by the federal gov-
ernment, even if that system is owned by another
entity, is also addressed.'9 7 By using the phrase
"protected computer"19 8 to describe non-federally
owned computer systems that are involved in in-
terstate commerce or affect the operation of fed-
erally owned computer systems, the statute goes
further than previous Nil-related statutes. 99 This
language was added by the National Information
Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996 to protect
any computer involved in Internet-related activi-
ties. 200 Jurisdiction under the statute is thus al-
ways federal because of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, eliminating problems associated with the
application of state laws which may provide defi-
ciencies in scope or are lacking in specificity to
computer based crimes. 20' The National Infor-
mation Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996 thus
closes many significant gaps in previous statutes
which served to hinder NII protection.
The statute also applies to acts committed by
persons who obtain authorized access or exceed
their authorized authority to access Nil sys-
tems. 20 2 It criminalizes the transmission or inser-
tion of a program or command into a protected
computer with the intent to cause damage. 203 Ad-
ditionally, the use of such a command or program
to defraud another party is a violation, regardless
of whether damage is done to the system. 20 4
Access issues such as those addressed by the Act
and its amendment in 1996 reflect the Second
195 See 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(2)(B).
196 See 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(2)(C).
197 See 18 U.S.C. §1030(e) (2) (A)
198 See 18 U.S.C. §1030(e) (2) (A)-(B) (stating that as used
in this section the term protected computer refers to "a com-
puter exclusively for use of a financial institution or the U.S.
Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for
such use, used by or for a financial institution or the U.S.
Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects
that use by or for the financial institution or the Government
or which is used in interstate, foreign commerce or commu-
nication").
199 See Dillon, supra note 191, at 508-09.
200 See id.
201 See generally Gwenn M. Kalow, Note, From the Internet to
Court: Exercising Jurisdiction Over World Wide Web Communica-
tions, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2241, 2253-56 (1997) (discussing
personal jurisdiction analyses relevant to the Internet).
202 See 18 U.S.C. §1030 (a)(5).
203 See 18 U.S.C. §1030(a) (5) (A).
204 See 18 U.S.C. §1030 (a) (2) (B)-(C).
Circuit's decision in United States v. Monis.20 5 In
Morris, the defendant, a doctrinal candidate at
Cornell University, released a virus into the NII
which eventually affected numerous installations,
including military sites.20 6 The defendant argued
that the Act was inapplicable because he had ac-
cess to the system and was therefore outside the
scope of the statute. 20 7 The Second Circuit re-
jected this statutory construction, finding that the
legislative history of the Act showed that Congress
did not intend to differentiate between unauthor-
ized access and access that exceeds authority.208
However, in its application of this construction,
the Court in Morris noted that the defense was not
entirely without merit because there had been no
firm statement by Congress on the subject.20 9
This ambiguity was remedied by the National In-
formation Infrastructure Protection Act of
1996.210
In addition to the National Information Infra-
structure Protection Act, other federal laws exist
which enforcement officials can invoke to protect
the NII. The National Stolen Property Act 211, and
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act212 are
useful tools in this area of law enforcement. The
National Stolen Property Act prohibits the trans-
portation in interstate commerce of goods worth
more than $5,000 which have been stolen or
fraudulently obtained.21 3 The use of this statute
in protecting the NII relates to cases involving
fraudulent transfer of funds or goods obtained
through manipulation of a computer system.214
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
passed in 1986, created prohibitions regarding
205 928 F.2d 504 (2 "d Cir. 1991).
206 See id. at 505-6.
207 See id. at 508-10.
208 See id. at 511.
209 See id.
210 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)(A). (allowing for criminal
penalties for whoever, having knowingly accessed a computer
without authorization or exceeding authorized access know-
ingly causes the transmission of a program, information,
code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, inten-
tionally causes damage to a protected computer shall be
guilty of a felony).
211 See National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §2314
(1994).
212 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§2510-2521, 2701-2710 (1994).
213 See 18 U.S.C. §2314 (describing application of the Na-
tional Stolen Property Act to fraudulent transfer of funds or
goods obtained through manipulation of a computer sys-
tem).
214 See id.
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the interception of wire and electronic communi-
cations and can be interpreted to extend to e-mail
and Internet communications transmitted over
the PSTN.2 15 Both statutes therefore enhance the
effectiveness of the National Information Infra-
structure Protection Act because prosecutors are
provided additional tools to assist them in NII
protection roles.
B. Federal Agency Jurisdiction
In evaluating the federal government's ability
to prosecute acts which disrupt the security of the
NII, it is necessary to examine the ability of indi-
vidual federal agencies to exercise jurisdiction.
The creation of numerous advisory committees,
task forces and public-private commissions com-
plicates the examination of agency roles in NII
protection. An obvious choice for enforcement of
statutes relating to the NII is the Department of
Justice ("DOJ"), however, there are many other
organizations that possess resources and responsi-
bilities mandated by statute, Executive Order or
simply institutional experience with information
infrastructures. Foremost among these organiza-
tions is the Department of Defense ("DOD").
The DOD has accumulated vast experience in
dealing with intruders into its information infra-
structure because of its elaborate security precau-
tions and the sheer size of its system. 2 16 This abil-
ity, however, is circumscribed by the limitations
placed upon the armed forces through statutes
providing that they not be used as posse comita-
tus.2 17 As a result, the DOD is forced to act in a
supporting role regarding NII protection. Other
organizations with the capability to assist in
preventing attacks on the NII, such as the Central
215 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(e).
216 See Hanseman, supra note 29, at 192-93.
217 See Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus, 18
U.S.C. §1385 (1994) (stating that whoever, except in cases
and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Consti-
tution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army
or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the
laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned note more
then two years, or both); see also, Naval Instruction 5820.7
(1975) (Extending 18 U.S.C. §1385 to the use of the Navy
and Marines as posse comitatus); see also BLACKS LAw DICTION-
ARY 1162 (6th ed. 1990) (defining posse comitatus as the entire
population of a county above the age of fifteen, which the
sheriff may summon in certain cases, as to aid him in keeping
the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons, etc.).
218 See 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3) (1994) (stating that the
Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena,
Intelligence Agency and the National Security
Council are barred from domestic operations218
and are unable to act independently of the DOJ
in preventing such activities. This is true even if
the individual responsible is later found to be lo-
cated in a foreign country.219 While limiting the
activities of the armed forces and intelligence
agencies in law enforcement area is a sound na-
tional policy, it does not equate with the roles that
these organizations have been given with regard
to the Nil.
Prior to the promulgation of PDD 62 and 63,
the lines between law enforcement and national
security functions in the NII was clearly drawn.
The Commerce Department's NTIA organization
conducted liaisons with private owners and opera-
tors within the NII, while the NTISSC coordinated
military and intelligence efforts. Adoption of the
PCCIP's recommendations blurred these two ar-
eas of NII protection. The result was the creation
of an organization which, while operationally lo-
cated within the DOJ, contains military and intelli-
gence personnel and utilizes them in a law en-
forcement capacity, namely, investigating
intrusions into civilian NII systems and reporting
to a member of the National Security Council. 220
Furthermore, some of the designated Lead Agen-
cies, such as the Department of Energy and the
Department of State, have little or no capability of
their own to conduct effective computer-based
NII protection due to a lack of institutional knowl-
edge of the subject.22 1 The significance of this ac-
tion was to create an organization that is not as
effective as its predecessors because it concen-
trates on inter-agency participation rather than
working with the owners and operators to re-
spond quickly and effectively to threats to the NIl.
law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions).
219 See id.
220 See Fact Sheet on PDD 62, supra note 173.
221 See generally, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEPART-
MENT OF ENERGY: PROCEDURES LACKING TO PROTECT COMPUT-
ERIZED DATA, Rep. No. GAO/AIMD-95-118 (1995) (describ-
ing an incident in 1993-94 during which the Department of
Energy discarded between 25 and 50 personal computers
which contained classified data and concludes that the De-
partment of Energy continues to adequately safeguard sensi-
tive information on its computer systems); see General Ac-
counting Office, Computer Security: Pervasive, Serious
Weaknesses Jeopardize State Department Operations, Rep.
No. GAO/AIMD-98-145, at 6 (1998) (charging that the De-
partment of State lacks a comprehensive information security
program).
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C. Proposed Nil Protection Organization
The establishment of the CICG, the NIPC and a
National Coordinator for NI protection is an im-
portant step in creating an awareness both inside
and outside of government of the necessity of NII
protection. 222 Awareness, however, is only the
first step in undertaking such an endeavor. A fun-
damental problem with the newly established
framework is that in attempting to solve the di-
lemma of NII security, it creates new ones. Fore-
most among these is the decentralization of au-
thority associated with the Lead Agencies
concept. The CICG policy-making procedure re-
quires the input of these agencies in formulating
new policies and proposed legislation on the
NII. 223 This structure is therefore susceptible to
the differing interests of its participants regarding
methods to be employed, resources to be allo-
cated, and to the individual agendas of each
agency involved.
Additionally, private industry has been reluc-
tant to become involved.224 PDD 63 calls for the
establishment of an Information Sharing and
Analysis Center ("ISAC") made up of private own-
ers and operators of the NII.225 In theory, this co-
ordination between the NIPC and the private sec-
tor is an excellent opportunity to create policy
and provide a forum for participation associated
with NII protection for groups outside the govern-
222 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 11, at 24 (stating the
importance of establishing mechanisms to protect the NII).
223 See White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection, supra
note 172 (describing the membership of the Critical Infra-
structure Coordination Group).
224 See The Role of Computer Security in Protecting U.S. Infra-
structures: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Science, Subcommit-
tee on Technology, 10 5 h Cong. 28, 31 (1998) (statement of Rus-
sell B. Stevenson, General Counsel, CyberCash, Inc.) (stating
that Congress should limit the role of government to (1) re-
search and education aimed at enabling private actors to pro-
tect their interests more effectively and (2) identifying and
addressing those weaknesses in the electronic infrastructure
as a whole that cannot be effectively addressed by the private
sector).
225 See White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection, supra
note 172 (stating that in operating the Information Sharing
and Analysis Center the National Coordinator shall consult
with owners and operators of the critical infrastructures to
strongly encourage the creation of a private sector informa-
tion sharing and analysis center with the actual design and
functions of the center and its relation to the NIPC deter-
mined by the private sector, in consultation with from the
federal government).
226 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 11, at 31-32 (discussing
legal impediments to information sharing by the public sec-
tor with Lead Agencies).
ment. The reality is that not only is there a reluc-
tance in the private sector for sharing information
among competitors that may erode public confi-
dence should a successful attack occur, the Lead
Agencies associated with the ISAC have regulatory
authority over the industries with which they are
to cooperate. 226 In establishing the ISAC con-
cept, the Clinton Administration did not follow
through on the PCCIP recommendation that
some mechanism be put into place to safeguard
proprietary information supplied by private own-
ers and operators.2 27 Release of potentially dam-
aging information to an industry affected by a
breakdown in part of the NII could lead to calls
for more stringent regulation or sanction from
the very agency which is supposed to be cooperat-
ing with the affected industry.228
Regarding the role of the federal government,
questions can be raised about the effectiveness of
the CICG and NIPC regarding intelligence and
dissemination of information. PDD 63 states that
prior to the distribution of law enforcement and
intelligence information the NIPC will "sanitize"
the release to eliminate any sensitive national se-
curity data.229  Additionally, coordination be-
tween the National Coordinator and the NIPC is
mandatory prior to the release of any public warn-
ings of attacks by internationally based threats to
227 The drafters of the PCCIP Report envisioned the cre-
ation of an environment that would allow the government
and private sector to share information openly and volunta-
rily. See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 11, at 31. Success, accord-
ing to the authors, depends on the ability to protect the NII
as well as disseminate needed information regarding threats.
See id. To accomplish this they proposed altering several
legal provisions that discourage participation in areas such as
antitrust, intellectual property and privacy. See id.
228 The PCCIP Report specifically mentions the need for
assurances by the federal government that information pro-
vided by private organizations in any information sharing re-
gime be given limited assurances that it will not be used
against the providers. See id. at 31-33. Areas in which these
assurances should be given according to report include anti-
trust, liability, trade secrets and other confidential business
information. See id. PDD 63 does not address these issues and
therefore does not remove any of the previously existing im-
pediments to information sharing which necessitated its pro-
mulgation. See id.
229 See White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
supra note 172 (stating that prior to the release of informa-
tion, the NIPC, in conjunction with the intelligence commu-
nity, will sanitize information for inclusion into analyses and
reports that it will provide federal, state and local agencies,
owners and operators of critical infrastructures and to any
private sector information sharing and analysis center).
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the NII. 23 0 There are two areas where these types
of security measures fall short.
First, by limiting intelligence information to
.data deemed to be non-threatening to national se-
curity, the threat to the NII increases because in-
complete information is disseminated.2 31 This in-
complete information can create vulnerabilities
because the affected portion of the NII may not
either appreciate the magnitude of the threat or
take incorrect precautions in response.
Second, the requirement of consultation with
the National Coordinator may have the effect of
slowing the process to the point of rendering a
warning system ineffective. 232 Information on the
Internet can be generated in the United States,
sent to an intermediate foreign destination, and
then routed back to the United States attack the
NII. 233 There is no clear distinction between
threats from within the United States and those
originating from overseas, the capabilities and the
will to act exist in both places.2 34 Because of the
anonymity associated with the Internet,235 the
sender of an attack on the NII can be anyone
from a stereotypical terrorist organization in the
Middle East, to a disgruntled computer program-
mer in Germany to a teenager in Basking Ridge,
New Jersey. There is no readily ascertainable way
to discover the true identity of an attacker until
after a period of investigation, by which time the
attack is over and the perpetrator may be reading
about the results in the New York Times. 236
The DOJ is the only agency with the capabilities
to effectively engage in both a law enforcement
and investigatory role without becoming involved
with regulatory oversight questions. Prior to the
introduction of the restructuring associated with
PDD 63, the FBI operated the IPTF using DOJ
personnel with the PCCIP acting in an advisory
role. 23 7 This centralization of NII protection
230 See id. (stating that except in extreme circumstances,
the NIPC shall coordinate with the National Coordinator
before issuing public warnings of imminent attacks by inter-
national terrorists, foreign states, or other malevolent foreign
powers).
231 See Molander, supra note 14. at 26 (describing the de-
creased effectiveness of previously utilized methods of intelli-
gence gathering and the difficulties in disseminating the in-
formation that is gathered).
232 See White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
supra note 172.
233 See supra text sections II(A) and II(B) (1) (describing
the operation of the Internet).
within one agency can serve to decrease inter-
agency problems which may arise in the context
of computer-based attacks because of confusion
over which is to take the lead in responding. Fur-
thermore, appropriations for NII protection can
be assigned to one specific entity, resulting in a
greater impact on operations. The Lead Agencies
concept can also work within this structure. By as-
signing specialists to the FBI-based organization,
the knowledge base necessary to understand the
problems associated with private industry can be
viewed from a technical, as opposed to a regula-
tory, perspective. 238 Defense and intelligence or-
ganizations should also be represented, although
only in an advisory capacity to share relevant and
uncensored intelligence with FBI personnel. This
change in mandate requires that the NTISSC
should be designated the primary organization
for parts of the NII involving national security
computer systems on an equal status with the FBI
organization. In this role, the permanent assign-
ment of FBI personnel to operate in law enforce-
ment rules should be contemplated to act upon
information gathered by NTISSC when national
security computer systems are involved.
The National Coordinator, the Clinton Admin-
istration's answer to the PCCIP's call for a coordi-
nated NII protection policy, should be retained in
its current role and given the task of coordination
between the operational entities at the FBI and
NTISSC and the National Security Counsel. This
allows the Coordinator to formulate overall pol-
icy, freeing personnel directly involved with inves-
tigations and enforcement to play their role as
protectors of the NII instead of being delegated
the responsibility to meet with an ever-expanding
number of advisory committees to debate future
legislation.
234 See Morth, supra note 29, at 571 (discussing informa-
tion warfare); see Rep. No. GAO/T-AIMD-96-108, supra note
133 at 2 (discussing the motivations of hackers).
235 See Reno, supra note 59, at 2334-35 (discussing the
anominity cyberspace).
236 See generally Amy Harmon, Hacker Group Commandeers
Times Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, September 14, 1998, at A10
(describing the Sept. 13, 1998 disruption of the New York
Times website by hackers).
237 See Exec. Ord. No. 13,010, supra note 135, at §7(a),
(e) (describing the operation and roles of the IPTF).
238 See PCCIP Report, supra note 15, at 31-34.
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V. CONCLUSION
The current structure of NII protection lacks
the ability to overcome the possibility of jurisdic-
tional and interagency based problems. The
agencies with the best capabilities for detection
and response to threats assigned to NII protection
are unable to effectively respond due to institu-
tional weaknesses in NII protection or, as in the
case of the DOD, are likely barred by statute from
doing so. The only proper solution is to return to
the bifurcation between civilian and military NII
protection that existed prior to PDD 62 and 63.
The NTISSC should work with the defense and in-
telligence related NII systems and the FBI should
assume responsibility for all private and non-de-
fense related government NII components while
providing law enforcement capability to the
NTISSC. The current laws in place are flexible
enough to allow for effective NII protection today.
However, without a clear organizational structure,
the NII's vulnerability will undoubtedly increase
because of jurisdictional and interagency dis-
putes.
[Vol. 7
